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OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING  
WEAPONS SYSTEMS EVALUATION GROUP  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20305

WSEG  
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3304-305  
3304-2526  
701570

26 August 1969

(U) Title: WSEG Report No. 148, *Strategic Offensive Weapons Employment in the Time Period About 1975 (U)*, August 1969. Short Title: WEPS.


(U) Conducted by: WSEG

For: ICS

(U) Purpose: The purpose of the study is to explore problems and issues related to employment of U.S. strategic forces in the middle 1970's; particular emphasis is given to problems associated with MIRV weapons and defended targets.

(U) Methodology: The capabilities of programmed U.S. forces were examined to determine the main features of possible attack alternatives. Attacks by POSITION MINUTEMAN and the BOMBER FORCE were examined, at first separately and then in mixes, against potential (b)(1) and military targets represented in detailed data bases. Major uncertainties in U.S. force capabilities, enemy target characteristics, intelligence projections of Sino-Soviet capabilities, and the manner in which hostilities develop were considered by applying ranges of values to such factors as force size, probabilities of arrival, and CEP, and target characteristics such as site hardness. Attack alternatives and planning guidelines were developed and then refined on the basis of detailed "topical" studies. Major topical studies included footprint constraints for MIRV; enemy ABM defenses; bomber penetration; and the vulnerability of strategic systems.

(S) Principal Findings:



(U) 7. In addition to the preceding findings the study developed, in several areas, new methodologies applicable to strategic offensive planning.

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INVENTORIED MAR 17 1975

7 MAR 10 1974 INVENTORIED MAR 14 1974  
INVENTORIED MAR 7 1974  
INVENTORIED APR 28 1970  
INVENTORIED FEB 04 1972

86 Aug 69

~~GROUP-1  
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downgrading and declassification~~

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~~EXCLUDED FROM EO 11652, Sec. 1.4(b) (2)  
OSD FS 27, Rev. 8 May 2000  
Review/Declass. on 18 Apr 2023  
Other App. Equity TBD~~

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WSEG  
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28. ~~August 1969~~

701.510(5-13-67) 13  
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1. (U) Title and Date:

WSEG Report No. 148, "Strategic Offensive Weapons Employment in the Time Period About 1975 (U)," August 1969. Short Title: WEPB.

Report # 148  
213.04  
334 WSEB  
701.510

2. (U) Questions Addressed:

The purpose of the study is to explore the problems and issues related to the employment of U.S. Strategic Forces in the middle 1970's; particular emphasis is placed upon the problems associated with MIRV weapons and defended targets.


3. (U) Effort Involved:

Six WSEG military and seventeen IDA civilian professionals worked fifteen months on this study.

INVENTORY JAN 15 1976

4. (TS) Principal Findings:

(b)(1)



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downgrading and  
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EXEMPT FROM EO 11958, Sec 1.4 (b) (1)  
OSDF Date 5 10 2000  
Review/Declassify On: 20 Apr 2001  
Other Agency Equity: YDD

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28 August 1969

(b)(1)

g. (U) In addition to the preceding findings, the study developed, in several areas, new methodologies applicable to strategic offensive planning.

5. ~~(TS)~~ Decisions Affected by the Study; Utility;

(b)(1)

6. (U) Appraisal of Quality:

The study is a comprehensive treatment of many important strategic planning factors for the mid-1970's; analytical investigations were effectively combined with realistic operational planning considerations.

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THE JOINT STAFF

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301  
PLANS AND POLICY DIRECTORATE (J-5)

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334-305  
334-4566  
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12 December 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

Subject: Follow-on Study: Strategic Offensive Forces (U)

1. Reference my memorandum, same subject, undated.
2. Attached is a strawman flimsy of a proposed memorandum to the Director, Weapons Systems Evaluation Group. This memorandum would provide terms of reference for follow-on studies.
3. A final flimsy will be prepared after further discussion and coordination among the Services and the Joint Staff action officers.
4. Proposed schedule of events under MOP 132 will be discussed at the initial action officers' meeting on 16 December.

7 MAR 1974 INVENTORIED

*Roy A. Miller*  
ROY A. MILLER  
Colonel, USAF  
Strategic Forces and  
Analysis Branch  
Extension 77251/77252

DISTRIBUTION:

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- Strategic Branch - Col Salter, 72692
- WSEG - Col Scott 57197

INVENTORY JAN 15 1976

~~Regraded Unclassified  
Excluded from automatic  
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INVENTORY MAR 17 1975

*M/C Gene Williams (USA)*  
*May Mendelbaum (USA)*

ENCLOSURE

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, WEAPONS SYSTEMS EVALUATION GROUP

Subject: Strategic Warfare Studies 1975-1981 (U) FY 1

1. ( ) Reference is made to:

a. CM-2384-67\* to the Director, Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, which is a statement of continuing requirements of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for WSEG study and analytical support to the Joint Program for Planning.

b. SM-351-67\*\* dated 13 May 1967, in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff requested that WSEG study the employment of strategic offensive weapons in the presence of enemy defenses for the mid-range period.

c. WSEG Report 148,\*\*\* subject: "Strategic Offensive Weapons Employment in the Time Period About 1975," dated August 1969, which was the final report in response to SM-351-67.

2. ( ) The Joint Chiefs of Staff request that WSEG study problems in programming and development of US strategic [offense] weapon systems in the mid-range period and including 1981. The study should include the implication of significant changes in the capabilities and effectiveness of Soviet and [redacted] strategic forces, possible in the period extending to 1981, and should evaluate the force planning alternatives open to the United States to counter adverse changes and to maintain a US strategic posture capable of achieving US military objectives.

3. ( ) Purpose and Objective. The primary purpose of this study will be to provide [redacted]. Therefore, the primary study objective should be to develop methodologies and [redacted] for determining the [redacted]

*this consideration should be given to*  
(taking into account) [redacted] ts, p [redacted]

[redacted], as well as possible [redacted] Emphasis

\* Attachment to JCS 2089/29  
\*\* Enclosure to JCS 2012/304  
\*\*\* Attachment to JCS 2012/304-3

should be given to the identification of plausible and possible trends and developments in weapons and to relating these developments to objectives and strategies in the JSOP. Specifically, the study should be [redacted]

4. ( ) Study Tasks. The Joint Chiefs of Staff require specific consideration of the following:

a. The Soviet <sup>+CPR</sup> threats to US strategic forces in the period beyond that covered in WSEG Report 148, i.e., from 1975 on out.

b. The ~~cost~~ and potential effectiveness of new US strategic systems, ~~improvements~~ in current systems, and the overall problem of ~~improving~~ ~~US~~ ~~strategic~~ ~~capabilities~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~late~~ ~~1970s~~, while ~~maintaining~~ ~~a~~ ~~high~~ ~~degree~~ ~~of~~ ~~confidence~~ ~~in~~ ~~meeting~~ ~~these~~ ~~requirements~~.

c. Changes and international developments which can affect the capabilities of both the United States, ~~and~~ <sup>and the CPR</sup> the USSR, including possible arms limitation agreements on the development or deployment of strategic systems.

d. Both US, <sup>and CPR</sup> and USSR weapons systems of the following types:

(1) ~~new~~ ~~and~~ ~~the~~ ~~deployment~~ ~~of~~ ~~advanced~~ ~~sea-based~~ systems to counter anti-SLBM efforts.

(2) ~~New~~ ~~and~~ ~~improved~~ ~~missile~~ ~~and~~ ~~anti-bomber~~ ~~systems~~ ~~including~~ ~~anti-bomber~~ ~~penetration~~ ~~systems~~ ~~designed~~ ~~to~~ ~~counter~~ ~~the~~ ~~build-up~~ ~~of~~ ~~ADMs~~ ~~and~~ ~~bomber~~ ~~defenses~~.

(3) ~~New~~ ~~and~~ ~~improved~~ ~~early~~ ~~warning~~ ~~systems~~ ~~and~~ ~~improved~~ ~~counter-ICBM~~ ~~capabilities~~.

e. Within the context of the preceding tasks, the study should consider the following specific problem areas: (This section will include any special study requirements desired by DDR&E, the Services, or the Joint Staff, but within the context of paragraphs 4a through d.)

(4) How about a ~~Special~~ ~~Command~~ ~~for~~ ~~these~~ ~~systems~~ ~~and~~ ~~improved~~ ~~counter-ICBM~~ ~~capabilities~~?

2

5. ( ) General guidelines on study methodology, scope and forces are as follows:

a. Methodology

(1) The study must consider the [redacted] objectives

Objectives as approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in JSOP and the operative objectives upon which the programmed forces are based must be considered in evaluating capabilities of US strategic forces.

(2) The study should focus on [redacted] and [redacted] of force elements.

Analysis should be in [redacted] and should [redacted] and [absolute merits] of various [redacted] systems.

[redacted] which might be made in future force development.

effectiveness comparisons.

(3) The study should relate employment considerations, such as developed in WSEG Report 148, to currently proposed and conceptual weapons design. [This is an area which was deferred, in the study program leading to WSEG Report 148, to follow-on study of forces in the post-1975 period.]

(4) The study should include force employment considerations in the context both of US initiation and US retaliation. (with bomber attacks where appropriate)

(5) The study must consider the total US strategic capability in evaluating strategic offensive forces.

(4) The study must consider the mutually [redacted] roles [redacted] offense and defense [redacted]

in accomplishing the US damage-limitation objectives and

increasing the survivability of US strategic offensive weapon systems. ~~Physical interactions between these forces as well as between US offensive forces and Soviet defensive forces, must be considered in determining the effectiveness and required capabilities of US strategic offensive forces.~~

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*Why highlight?*

~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ detailed analysis i.e., the survivability of US strategic offensive forces under attack by projected Soviet strategic offensive weapons. *and CPR*

*(Herbert interested in how do you get PLS for future systems)*

b. Scope

*9*  
*old*

(1) The study should concentrate on the employment of future US strategic offensive weapons in the presence of future Soviet defenses; a major portion of the study effort should be directed to ballistic missiles equipped with MIRV employed against heavily defended urban-industrial and military complexes.

*9*

(2) While primary emphasis should be on the period after 1975, the study may include analyses of forces prior to 1975 such as study areas not sufficiently developed in WSEG Report 148, ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

*9*

(3) The study should consider those study areas in WSEG Report 148 which are applicable to weapon systems in the post-1975 time period, or which require more detailed analysis than was accomplished in the previous study.

Examples are:

(a)

(b)

*4*



J

Objectives  
Recognition  
Should be  
Given to

(4) The study should be responsive to analysis requirements of the Joint Chiefs of Staff based on changes or possible changes to force structures induced as a result of SALT. *In addressing the full range of US Strategic*

(1) (5) The recent analysis of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in response to National Security Study Memorandum No. 64 *which* indicated a possible need for US capability to deter or to respond to ~~\_\_\_\_\_ nuclear attack by the \_\_\_\_\_~~

<sup>CRK</sup> If this capability is adopted by the United States as a necessary element of strategy, new force planning considerations will be introduced into the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan. In this event, the study should be extended as necessary to include this form of warfare, related US objectives, force capabilities, and requirements. Supplementary instructions by the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be provided as required.

c. Forces

*Insert #2*

(1) While it is not the intent of the study to examine, or to seek judgments on, questions of overall force structure size or composition, it is necessary that the analyses of offense and defense missile interactions include the kinds of strategic missile systems which the US force may include and the kinds of Soviet missile defenses they may have to counter. Accordingly, the analysis should include consideration of US strategic offensive ballistic missile systems of each type recommended for the US force through 1980.

Don't put  
assumptions  
or conclusions

(2) Where quantitative assumptions are necessary for force interactions, the force level objectives in Book II, Volume II, JSOP 72-79 will be used as a basis. Adjustments in the quantities of newer systems entering the inventory

5

during that period should be made to support meaningful  
analysis of such systems, considering the threats and US  
objectives. [ *Insert # 7* ]

SAFEGUARD Phase II

reported  
in the

(3) The study should

which appear  
capable of contributing to US force capabilities within the  
mid-range period and which may warrant development. The  
study should develop

analytical base on which judgments can be reached in recom-  
mending objective force levels.

Baselines for quantitative Soviet and forces  
should be those forces in the current Joint Intelligence  
Estimate for Planning, as updated. The higher-than-expected  
threat will be the updated high end of the National  
Intelligence Projections for Planning (NIPP). However, it

will include minority views as they pertain to the ABM  
capabilities system.

Upward and downward excursions may be made as  
necessary to support analyses if properly identified and  
justified in the analyses.

(5) Soviet area and terminal bomber and missile defenses  
should be structured to minimize the US options for prefer-  
ential attacks by missile or bomber delivered weapons.

6. ( ) Users of the Study. Data from this study will be used  
primarily by:

a. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Services for mid-range  
planning (the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP)).

*budget  
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*Don't  
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b. The DDR&E and military services for weapon systems development considerations.

7. ( ) Study Schedule. It is proposed that the study be conducted in two phases geared to the development of JSOP 73-80 and 74-81. The study program should include a first report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by 31 August 1970 for use in the preparation of Volume II, JSOP 73-80. The final study report should be provided in August of 1971 in phase with the following cycle for JSOP FY 74-81. Interim progress briefings with written briefing summaries should be scheduled when appropriate to meet the requirements of DDR&E and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

8. ( ) Continuing Coordination. To insure understanding of requirements of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the application of results as the study progresses through its phases, close liaison with the J-5 Directorate of the Joint Staff should be maintained to coordinate questions on assumptions, objectives, strategy and criteria to be used.

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

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701.510 (5-13-69) Sec 3, TS  
SM-774-69

20 November 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, WEAPONS SYSTEMS EVALUATION GROUP

Subject: WSEG Report 148 - Strategic Offensive Weapons  
Employment in the Time Period About 1975

SM 774-69  
Report # 148  
334 JCS  
334 WSEG  
701.510

1. On 8 November 1969, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the assessment in the Appendix hereto for inclusion as a preface to WSEG Report 148. It is requested that this assessment be transmitted to the holders of WSEG Report 148 and accompany any additional distribution of the report.

2. Without attachment, this memorandum is UNCLASSIFIED.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

*Roy C. Crompton*  
ROY C. CROMPTON  
Brigadier General, USAF  
Secretary

Attachment

INVENTORY JAN 15 1976  
INVENTORY MAR 17 1975  
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Copy 1 of 28 Copies each  
of / pages series "A"

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ASSESSMENT OF WSEG REPORT 148

1. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have noted this report and regard it as a source of background information for strategic objectives and operational planning and for further study of strategic offensive weapons systems.

2. ~~(TS)~~ There are important cautions which must be observed to avoid making erroneous conclusions when using the report. For proper understanding, the principal findings and conclusions, as summarized in Volume I of the report, must be considered in context with the purpose of the study and with the analyses contained in the topical studies, Volumes II-X. Footnote comments in the report must be noted carefully to assure complete understanding of each discussion.

Following are specific comments:

(b)(1)



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*Atch to*  
209890

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JCS 2012/304-4

24 October 1969

Pages 15 - 34, incl.

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JCS-2012/304-4  
Report #148  
334-JCS  
334-WSEL  
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REPORT BY THE J-5  
to the  
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
on

WSEG REPORT 148 - STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS  
EMPLOYMENT IN THE TIME PERIOD ABOUT 1975 (U)  
Reference: JCS 2012/304-4

DECISION 7 MAR 1974 INVENTORIED

INVENTORY MAR 17 1975  
INVENTORY JAN 15 1976

1. At their meeting on 4 November 1969, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, after making amendments, approved the recommendations contained in paragraph 14 of this report. On 8 November 1969, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved further changes to this report.

2. This Decision replaces page 15. Holders are requested to substitute the additional attached revised pages 19 through 32, incl, incorporating the amendments, and to destroy the superseded pages in accordance with security regulations.

3. The memorandum in Enclosure A, together with copies of the subject report,\* was forwarded as JCSM-698-69, dated 20 November 1969, to the Secretary of Defense. The memorandum in Enclosure B, together with copies of the subject report, was forwarded as SM-743-69, dated 20 November 1969, to the Director of Strategic Target Planning. The memorandum in Enclosure C, together with copies of the subject report, was forwarded as SM-744-69, dated 20 November 1969, to CINCLANT, USCINCEUR, CINCPAC, and CINCSAC. The memorandum in Enclosure D, together with copies of the subject report, was forwarded as SM-745-69, dated 20 November 1969, to the Director, Joint Continental Defense Systems Integration Planning Staff. The assessment of WSEG Report 148 in Enclosure E was bound as the first document inside the first cover of Volume I of the subject report.\* The Director, J-5, was requested by SM-746-69, dated 20 November 1969, to take the action indicated in subparagraph 14f.

4. In that the Commandant had expressed direct concern of the Marine Corps in this matter, the provisions of Title 10, US Code 141 (c), applied and were followed.

INVENTORY MAR 14 1977

INVENTORY MAR 17 1973

~~GROUP 3  
DOWNGRADED AT 10 YEAR INTERVALS;  
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED~~

\* Attachment to JCS 2012/304-3

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JCS 2012/304-4

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WSEG REPORT 148 - STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS  
EMPLOYMENT IN THE TIME PERIOD ABOUT 1975 (U)

THE PROBLEM

1. To evaluate WSEG Report 148, Strategic Offensive Weapons Employment in the Time Period About 1975,\* for joint planning purposes.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. In SM-351-67,\*\* dated 13 May 1967, the Joint Chiefs of Staff requested the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG) to conduct a study of strategic offensive weapons employment in the presence of defenses during the full mid-range period. This study was requested for use in mid-range JSOP planning and in strategic operational planning.

3. Phase I of the study was completed and reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in WSEG Report 132,\*\*\* Strategic Offensive Weapons Employment in the Presence of Defenses (WEPS), dated June 1968. This report, which provided a definition of Phase II of the study program, was approved by the Joint Staff in J-5 SM 1118-68.\*\*\*\* WSEG Report 132 provided that Phase II of the study would cover the period 1970-1975, would use US programmed forces, and would focus on weapon employment. Also, it recognized that studies covering the period beyond 1975 and weapon system design implications would be follow-on study efforts.

4. WSEG Report 148, dated 26 August 1969, is the report on Phase II of the study and is the final report in response to SM-351-67.

DISCUSSION

5. For discussion, see Enclosure F.

- \* Attachment to JCS 2012/304-3  
\*\* Enclosure to JCS 2012/304  
\*\*\* Attachment to JCS 2012/304-2  
\*\*\*\* Attachment to 1st N/H to JCS 2012/304-2

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JCS 2012/304-4



CONCLUSIONS

6. The report is responsive to the requirements of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the exceptions indicated.

7. WSEG Report 148 should be noted and regarded as a source of background information for strategic objectives and operational planning and for further study of strategic offensive weapon systems.

8. The report and the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the report should be provided to the Secretary of Defense for his information.

9. The report and comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be provided to the Director of Strategic Target Planning for his comments and use in further study definition by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

10. Based on Memorandum of Policy No. 39, the report and comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be provided to the commanders of unified and specified commands who have a SIOP role.

11. The report and comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be provided to the Director, Joint Continental Defense Systems Integration Planning Staff.

12. To insure that each user of the report is aware of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on use of the report, comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be bound in Volume I of WSEG Report 148 as guidance to users.

13. Follow-on study requirements should be determined and, if appropriate, tasked to WSEG as soon as possible. This should be done as a separate action by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

RECOMMENDATIONS

14. It is recommended that:

- a. The memorandum in Enclosure A, together with copies of the report,\* which reflects the conclusions in paragraphs 7 and 8 above, be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense.

\* Attachment to JCS 2012/304-3

- b. The memorandum in Enclosure B, and copies of the report,\* 1  
which reflects the conclusions in paragraphs 7 and 9 above, 2  
be forwarded to the Director of Strategic Target Planning. 3
- c. The memorandum in Enclosure C, and copies of the report,\* 4  
which reflects the conclusions in paragraphs 7 and 10 above, 5  
be forwarded to CINCLANT, USCINCEUR, CINCPAC, and CINCSAC. 6
- d. The memorandum in Enclosure D, and a copy of the report,\* 7  
which reflects the conclusions in paragraphs 7 and 11 above, 8  
be forwarded to the Director, Joint Continental Defense Systems 9  
Integration Planning Staff. 10
- e. The memorandum in Enclosure E, which reflects the conclu- 11  
sions in paragraphs 7 and 12 above, be bound as the first docu- 12  
ment inside the front cover of Volume I of the report.\* 13
- f. Follow-on study requirements to support the Joint Program 14  
for Planning be determined and, if appropriate, referred to 15  
the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group as soon as possible. 16
- g. This paper NOT be forwarded to the commanders of unified 17  
or specified commands. 18
- h. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned to 19  
NATO activities. 20
- i. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US Delegation, 21  
United Nations Military Staff Committee. 22

Action Officers: Colonel R. A. Miller, USAF  
Colonel W. F. Graves, USA  
Captain V. D. Maynard, USN  
Strategic Forces and Analysis Branch, J-5  
Extension 77251/77252/52145

\* Attachment to JCS 2012/304-3



ENCLOSURE A

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

JCSM-698-69

20 November 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: WSEG Report 148 - Strategic Offensive Weapons  
Employment in the Time Period About 1975 (U)

1. (U) Reference is made to WSEG Report 148\* which is a report on a study of strategic offensive weapons employment. The general purpose of this study was to illuminate and explore problems and issues related to the employment of US strategic weapons in the middle 1970s.

2. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff note the report and regard it as a source of background information for strategic objectives and operational planning and for further study of strategic offensive weapon systems. The report, with the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is forwarded herewith for your information.


3. ~~(TS)~~ The report treats some important strategic planning factors for the mid-1970s. The major substantive areas considered are:

a. The application of MIRVs and other US force elements to realistic target data bases and consideration of smaller yield weapons in conjunction with more finely detailed target representations.

b. The penetration of projected Soviet ABM defenses.

c. The vulnerability of offensive and defensive systems to nuclear effects.

d. The role of the manned bomber forces and the problem of penetrating air defense.



\* Attachment to JCS 2012/304-3

4. (S) A major feature of the study is the recurring attempt to devise methodologies to deal with uncertainties and to examine, in parametric terms, the adequacy of strategic weapons employment and plans in the face of these uncertainties in the mid-1970s. Several new techniques were developed to handle weapons employment problems.

5. (TS) There are important cautions which must be observed to avoid making erroneous conclusions when using the report. For proper understanding, the principal findings and conclusions, as summarized in Volume I of the report, must be considered in context with the purpose of the study and with the analyses contained in the topical studies, Volumes II-X. Footnote comments in the report must be noted carefully to assure complete understanding of each discussion. Following are specific comments:

(b)(1)



(b)(1)



6. (U) Without attachment, this memorandum is removed from the ~~RESTRICTED DATA~~ category.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Signed

DAVID I. LIEBMAN  
Major General, USAF  
Deputy Director, Joint Staff

Attachment



ENCLOSURE B  
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

BM-743-69

20 November 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF STRATEGIC TARGET PLANNING

Subject: WSEG Report No. 148, Strategic Weapons  
Employment in the Time Period About 1975 (U)

1. (U) Reference is made to WSEG Report 148\*, which is the report on a study of strategic offensive weapons employment requested\* by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (copy attached). The general purpose of this study was to illuminate and explore problems and issues related to the employment of US strategic weapons in the middle 1970s.
2. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff note the report and regard it as a source of background information for strategic objectives and operational planning and for further study of strategic offensive weapon systems. The report, with the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is forwarded herewith for your information.
3. (TS) There are important cautions which must be observed to avoid making erroneous conclusions when using the report. For proper understanding, the principal findings and conclusions, as summarized in Volume I of the report, must be considered in context with the purpose of the study and with the analyses contained in the topical studies, Volumes II-X. Footnote comments in the report must be noted carefully to assure complete understanding of each discussion. Following are specific comments:

(b)(1)

~~GROUP 3  
Downgraded in 12/1/88  
Intervals not  
automatically declassified~~

\* Attachment to JCS 2012/304-3  
\*\* Enclosure to JCS 2012/304

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4. (U) To assist the Joint Chiefs of Staff in defining further study effort, your comments on the following would be appreciated:

a. Value of the report in illuminating factors to be considered in design and structure of future strategic offensive forces.

b. Value of the report for use in developing future rules and procedures for strategic offensive force employment.

c. Other comments as desired.

5. (U) The study group which prepared this report may be tasked for follow-on studies on strategic forces employment the mid-range period 1975. Please provide recommendations in Volume I, of the report, for recommended limited study areas within the context of the study program outlined in this section for tasking the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group.

6. (U) Considering the broad scope of the study and the great detail contained in the 10 volumes, it is desired that your staff have sufficient time for a thorough review before making comments. If staff resources will permit, general comments and recommendations are desired within 20 days after receipt of the report.

7. (U) Without attachment, this memorandum is removed from the ~~SECRETED DATA~~ category.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Signed

ROY C. CROMPTON  
Brigadier General, USAF  
Secretary

Attachment


TOP SECRET  
JCS 2012/304-4

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Enclosure B

(Revised by Decision - 20 November 1969)





ENCLOSURE C

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

SM-744-69

20 November 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Commander in Chief, Atlantic  
US Commander in Chief, Europe  
Commander in Chief, Pacific  
Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command

Subject: WSEG Report 148 - Strategic Offensive Weapons  
Employment in the Time Period About 1975 (U)

1. (U) Reference is made to WSEG Report 148,\* which is the report on a study of strategic offensive weapons employment requested by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. The general purpose of this study was to illuminate and explore problems and issues related to the employment of US strategic weapons in the middle 1970s.

2. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff note the report and regard it as a source of background information for strategic objectives and operational planning and for further study of strategic offensive weapon systems. The report, with the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is forwarded herewith for your information.

3. ~~(TS)~~ The report treats some important strategic planning factors for the mid-1970s. The major substantive areas considered are:

a. The application of MIRVs and other US force elements to realistic target data bases and the consideration of smaller yield weapons in conjunction with more finely detailed target representations.

b. The penetration of projected Soviet ABM defenses.

c. The vulnerability of offensive and defensive systems to nuclear effects.

d. The role of the manned bomber forces and the problem of penetrating air defense.

~~GROUP 3  
Downgraded at 12 year  
intervals; not  
automatically declassified~~

\* Attachment to JCS 2012/304-3  
\*\* Enclosure to JCS 2012/304

4. ~~(C)~~ A major feature of the study is the recurring attempt to devise methodologies to deal with uncertainties and to examine, in parametric terms, the adequacy of strategic weapons employment and plans in the face of these uncertainties in the mid-1970s. Several new techniques were developed to handle weapon employment problems.

5. ~~(S)~~ There are important cautions which must be observed to avoid making erroneous conclusions when using the report. For proper understanding, the principal findings and conclusions, as summarized in Volume I of the report, must be considered in context with the purpose of the study and with the analyses contained in the topical studies, Volumes II-X. Footnote comments in the report must be noted carefully to assure complete understanding of each discussion. Following are specific comments:

(b)(1)



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6. (U) Without attachment, this memorandum is removed from the ~~RESTRICTED DATA~~ category.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Signed

ROY C. CROMPTON  
Brigadier General, USAF  
Secretary

Attachment

TOP SECRET  
JCS 2012/304-4

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Enclosure C

(Revised by Decision - 20 November 1969)



ENCLOSURE D


THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

SM-745-69  
20 November 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, JOINT CONTINENTAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS  
INTEGRATION PLANNING STAFF

Subject: WSEG Report 148 - Strategic Offensive Weapons  
Employment in the Time Period About 1975 (U)

1. (U) Reference is made to WSEG Report 148,\* which is the report on a study of strategic offensive weapons employment requested by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. The general purpose of this study was to illuminate and explore problems and issues related to the employment of US strategic weapons in the middle 1970s.
2. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff note the report and regard it as a source of background information for strategic objectives and operational planning and for further study of strategic offensive weapon systems. The report, with the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is forwarded herewith for your information.
3. ~~(TS)~~ The report treats some important strategic planning factors for the mid-1970s. The major substantive areas considered are:
  - a. The application of MIRVs and other US force elements to realistic target data bases and the consideration of smaller yield weapons in conjunction with more finely detailed target representations.
  - b. The penetration of projected Soviet ABM defenses.
  - c. The vulnerability of offensive and defensive systems to nuclear effects.
  - d. The role of the manned bomber forces and the problem of penetrating air defense.



\* Attachment to JCS 2012/304-3  
\*\* Enclosure to JCS 2012/304

TOP SECRET

4. ~~(C)~~ A major feature of the study is the recurring attempt to devise methodologies to deal with uncertainties and to examine, in parametric terms, the adequacy of strategic weapons employment and plans in the face of these uncertainties in the mid-1970s. Several new techniques were developed to handle weapon employment problems.

(b)(1)



TOP SECRET  
JCS 2012/304-4

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Enclosure D

(Revised by Decision - 20 November 1969)

(b)(1)



6. (U) Without attachment, this memorandum is removed from the ~~RESTRICTED DATA~~ category.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Signed

ROY C. CHOMPION  
Brigadier General, USAF  
Secretary

Attachment

ENCLOSURE E

ASSESSMENT OF WSEG REPORT 148

1. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have noted this report and regard it as a source of background information for strategic objectives and operational planning and for further study of strategic offensive weapons systems.

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5. A major feature of the study is the recurring attempt to devise methodologies to deal with uncertainties and to examine, in parametric terms, the adequacy of strategic weapons employment and plans in the face of these uncertainties in the mid-1970s. Several new techniques were developed to handle weapons employment problems.

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6. This study should be considered in conjunction with other past and current studies as part of an analytical data base which can be useful in making judgments on strategic offensive weapons employment.

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7. A proposed follow-on study program is contained in Volume I, Section XI. These proposals relate closely to the original tasking directive (SM-351-67), which referred to design implications and force planning methodologies in addition to force employment considerations. Such follow-on studies in areas defined and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff would also be in consonance with CM-2384-67,\* which defined continuing requirements of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for WSEG study and analytical support. An immediate assessment of requirements of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for further studies on strategic offensive forces appears timely and necessary to give the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group further guidance.

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\*Attachment to JCS 2089/29