

involving any major new approach to the problem are not feasible until the end of the year. Their concern regarding timing should of course be considered in that light, and clearly they would share the Department's conviction that disarmament must not become a political football. Needless to say, the Department would not want to be in the position of appearing to suppress any report the Panel may make. We have not in fact seen that there is any necessary connection between the elections, and either the work of the Panel or our efforts in the UN.

In this connection, we feel very strongly that the US Government has maintained a successful initiative in this field and has an unusually favorable position vis-à-vis the USSR as a result of our efforts to date. We recommend that no steps be taken or decision reached which would affect this initiative without the most careful examination of all aspects of the problem.

G/PM files, lot 68 D 349, "Use Policy 1950-1955"

*Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense (Lovett), and the Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (Dean)*¹

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 10, 1952.

Subject: Agreed Concepts Regarding Atomic Weapons

References:

A. Memo for Secretaries of State and Defense and Chairman, AEC, from Executive Secretary, NSC, same subject, dated August 5, 1952²

B. Memo for Secretaries of State and Defense from Executive Secretary, NSC, same subject, dated August 18, 1952³

The Secretaries of State and Defense concurred in the amendments to the enclosure to Reference A on the subject, proposed by the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission as indicated in Reference B. The Secretary of Defense, in concurring in these amendments, made the following comment: "The Department of

¹ A typewritten notation on the source text indicates that this memorandum and its enclosure were reclassified as Secret on Sept. 30, 1952, by James S. Lay, Jr.

² This memorandum, not printed, circulated a draft statement of agreed concepts regarding atomic weapons prepared by designated representatives of State, Defense, and the AEC. It is filed with an earlier draft, circulated by Lay on July 3. (G/PM files, lot 68 D 349, "Use Policy 1950-1955")

³ The memorandum of Aug. 18, not printed, transmitted proposed amendments to the draft statement proposed by the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. (G/PM files, lot 68 D 349, "Use Policy 1950-1955")

Defense is informed that the changes in text proposed by the Atomic Energy Commission in the subject paper are designed to clarify its language and not to alter its substance".

Accordingly, the enclosed statement of "Agreed Concepts Regarding Atomic Weapons", as amended and adopted by the Special Committee of the National Security Council on Atomic Energy, was submitted to the President for his consideration, together with advice that the question of the classification of certain atomic weapons data as it affects SHAPE planning is being investigated by the Atomic Energy Commission in consultation with the Department of Defense and that the findings will be reported back to the Special Committee for subsequent consideration.⁴

The President has this date approved the enclosure as the basis for the preparation of detailed papers designed to carry out these agreed concepts.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.

[Annex]

*Statement Adopted by the Special Committee of the National
Security Council on Atomic Energy*

AGREED CONCEPTS REGARDING ATOMIC WEAPONS

1. *Function of this Special Committee of the National Security Council in Advising the President on Use of Atomic Weapons*
 - a. By law, the National Security Council is to "advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign and military policies relating to the national security." By direction of the President, the Special Committee of the National Security Council on Atomic Energy, consisting of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, is to "pass on the directives which I have to make, that affect all three of those Departments."
 - b. The above directives are interpreted to mean that the President wants the advice of the Special Committee before making any decision regarding the major production objectives of the atomic energy program, the preparatory deployment of atomic weapons, and the use of atomic weapons. This is not interpreted as limiting the statutory function of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as "the principal

⁴ A copy of the memorandum submitted to President Truman on Sept. 10 and its enclosure, the statement on agreed concepts on atomic weapons approved by State, Defense, and the AEC, is in the Truman Library, PSF-Subject file, "NSC Atomic-Atomic Weapons Agreed Concepts".

military advisers to the President, the National Security Council and the Secretary of Defense.”

2. *Use of Atomic Weapons*

In the event of a positive decision, the President would authorize the Secretary of Defense to use atomic weapons under such conditions as the President may specify.

3. *Atomic Weapons Stockpile Custody and Operation*

a. *Custodial Responsibility.* The Department of Defense should have custodial responsibility for stocks of atomic weapons outside of the continental United States and for such numbers of atomic weapons in the continental United States as may be needed to assure operational flexibility and military readiness for use subject to 2, above. The Atomic Energy Commission should maintain custodial responsibility for the remainder of the stockpile of atomic weapons.

b. *Provision of Storage Facilities.* Each agency should provide the facilities for storage of atomic weapons over which it maintains custodial responsibility. However, where custodial responsibility may be changed by Presidential directive without physical movement of weapons, reimbursement for existing storage facilities should not be required.

c. *Physical Security and Operation of Storage Sites.* In the interests of operational readiness and economy of personnel, the Department of Defense should provide the physical security and the services required for the operation of all storage sites for atomic weapons. For storage facilities for which the Atomic Energy Commission is responsible, the services provided by the Department of Defense should include normal administrative services, and, under the technical supervision of the Atomic Energy Commission, the performance of such maintenance, surveillance, modernization, and modification work as is determined appropriate for accomplishment at the site.

d. *Access to Atomic Weapons.* The Department of Defense should provide the Atomic Energy Commission with surveillance information on atomic weapons under Department of Defense custody, and access to such weapons for such purposes as the Atomic Energy Commission may determine to be necessary, including the determination of the effects of environmental and operational conditions and rotation, modification and major retrofit programs.

4. *The Establishment of Military Requirements and Characteristics of Atomic Weapons*

a. The Department of Defense should state its military requirements for numbers and types of atomic weapons, including the desired military characteristics thereof.

b. The Atomic Energy Commission should propose rates of production and production goals for weapon materials in the light of stated military requirements and of the Commission's capabilities for meeting these requirements.

c. The President, in the light of a and b above, will determine the atomic weapon production program.

d. In consonance with the responsibility of the Department of Defense to indicate the desired military characteristics of atomic weapons, the Department of Defense should establish appropriate criteria and conduct such tests and evaluations, beyond those conducted by the Atomic Energy Commission, as deemed necessary to ascertain the acceptability of weapons to meet these military characteristics.

Note: Approved by the President on September 10, 1952, as the basis for preparation of detailed papers designed to carry out these agreed concepts.

330.13/9-1152

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy United States Representative on the United Nations Disarmament Commission (Cohen)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 11, 1952.

Subject: Panel of Consultants on Disarmament

Participants: Robert Oppenheimer—Disarmament Panel
B. V. Cohen—UNA

Dr. Oppenheimer came to see me to tell me something about the work of the Panel.

Dr. Oppenheimer stated that the Panel had taken their work seriously and had done considerable hard thinking on the subject. He emphasized that the Panel had, he thought, made very considerable progress in educating themselves so that individually and as a group they could be much more helpful than when they first started their work last spring.

While the Panel was working on their report, they did not contemplate making their report until after the turn of the year. Mr.