Atomic Stockpiles Memorandum

The DoS analysis demonstrates a fairly clear inclination towards increasing presidential authority over nuclear weapons. First, the State Department document enthusiastically supports a “constructive” memorandum by Dr. Sterns pertaining to the “custody” and “control” of NATO-based nuclear weapons. Sterns suggests incorporating the use of a so-called “interlock,” a device that would allow a nuclear weapon to be maintained in an ongoing “untriggered” state but would also allow the weapon be triggered for immediate use by anyone having the “key.” The authors of the document emphasize Sterns’ idea that an electronic (opposed to a manual) interlock could be triggered remotely, possibly by the president himself, and that such a feature would be a particularly attractive option, though they add that such technology is “unfortunately” some years away.

The second memorandum analyzed in the document is a memorandum by the Joint Chief of Staff that the State Department authors believe displays some worrisome tendencies. The authors suggest the military might severely overestimate its level of authority in the custody, control, and use of nuclear weapons. Particularly noteworthy is the authors’ preoccupation that the military might end up exercising undue authority over nuclear weapons at the detriment of Presidential authority:

“Perhaps the most disconcerting aspect of the JCS paper, however, is the feeling one gets from its general tenor that units in the field equipped with the weapons are going to use them when and how they see fit; that in the last analysis one must expect that for the most part commanders of each units will put those weapons to use almost automatically when they consider they are under attack without awaiting a decision by the President.”