NSC-30, “United States Policy on Atomic Warfare”

The report framed its “analysis” of nuclear weapons around questions of the intersection of military and political questions:

The decision to employ atomic weapons is a decision of highest policy. The circumstances prevailing when war is joined cannot be wholly forecast with any greater certainty than can the arrival of war. It appears imprudent either to prescribe or to prohibit beforehand the use of any particular weapons when the character of future conflict is subject only to imperfect prediction. In this circumstance, a prescription preceding diagnosis could invite disaster. […]

In this matter, public opinion must be recognized as a factor of considerable importance. Deliberation or decision on a subject of this significance, even if clearly affirmative, might have the effect of placing before the American people a moral question of vital security significance at a time when the full security impact of the question had not become apparent. If this decision is to be made by the American people, it should be made in the circumstances of an actual emergency when the principal factors involved are in the forefront of public consideration.

Foreign opinion likewise demands consideration. Official discussion respecting the use of atomic weapons would reach the Soviets, who should in fact never be given the slightest reason to believe that the U.S. would even consider not to use atomic weapons against them if necessary. It might take no more than a suggestion of such consideration, perhaps magnified into a doubt, were it planted in the minds of responsible Soviet officials, to provoke exactly that Soviet aggression which it is fundamentally U.S. policy to avert. […]

The time and circumstances under which atomic weapons might be employed are incapable of accurate determination prior to the evident imminence of hostilities. The type and character of targets against which atomic weapons might be used is primarily a function of military selection in the preparation and planning of grand strategy. In this case, however, there is the additional requirement for blending a political with a military responsibility in order to assure that the conduct of war, to the maximum extent practicable, advances the fundamental and lasting aims of U.S. policy.

It is of note that this may be the first report to formalize the unilateral authority of the President of the United States for nuclear use:

The decision as to the employment of atomic weapons in the event of war is to be made by the Chief Executive when he considers such decision to be required.

The impetus for this memo came in May 1948, when Kenneth C. Royall, the Secretary of the Army, requested that a formal study be made on the issue of nuclear weapon use. In the request, Royall noted that:

In addition to the basic question of engaging in or initiating atomic warfare there arises a question of what agent or agency of the Government shall be empowered to authorize actual employment. Employment might be undertaken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on their own initiative, or the decision to authorize employment might be reserved to the President or to some other agent of the Government. It is important that this authority and responsibility be made perfectly clear in order that there will be no delay in acting in event the United States is subjected to sudden attack. ¹

The question of authority, then, was clearly still an unanswered one in 1948, and there still existed other possible options (the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for example) for where that authority might be derived.

The State Department, upon receiving Royall’s request, noted that, “The question raised by Secretary Royall… has never officially come before the Department.” In an additional memo, State Department employee Edmund A. Gullion suggested that:

With respect to the locus of authority for the decision to employ, it is difficult to see where it could be other than with the President, [National] Security Council and Joint Chiefs. Studies can surely be undertaken to see that ways are cleared for prompt decisions. ²

This again indicates that it was not at all obvious that authority over nuclear weapons would be vested only in the President.

1. Kenneth C. Royall, “United States Policy on Atomic Warfare,” (19 May 1948), in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Volume 1 , 572-573.
2. Undated notes from the State Department on Kenneth C. Royall’s “United States Policy on Atomic Warfare,” (19 May 1948), in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Volume 1 , 570-572.